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REVIEWING LESSONS LEARNT OF SARS IN SINGAPORE 
DURING PLANNING FOR INFLUENZA PANDEMIC   
GREGORY C T CHAN 1,  D.KOH  2 
ABSTRACT 
There were many lessons learnt in Singapore’s fight against SARS, and they have 
proven to be all the more important in our preparations for an influenza pandemic. The 
following lessons are discussed in this paper including: the widespread ramifications 
among the various sectors in Singapore (individuals, organizations, community and 
economy), the first principles of outbreak response, need for enhanced infectious 
disease control measures, high demands on the healthcare system, the role of 
management policies implementation and dissemination, multidisciplinary involvement, 
importance of communication, and business continuity planning.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
Severe respiratory distress syndrome (SARS) was Singapore’s most prominent 
global health threat. A new entity then in 2003 that caught everyone off-guard; 
contributed no doubt to the fact that SARS was a novel variant of coronavirus.1-4 The 
global outbreak had both an insidious and yet formidable onset. By the time there was a 
suspicion that the world had an unprecedented pathogen in mid-March 2003, it had 
already culminated as simultaneous outbreaks in 28 countries. Singapore was one of 
those severely affected. By the beginning of June, there was a cumulative total of more 
than 8430 probable cases and close to 800 deaths, of which Singapore had 238 probable 
cases and 31 deaths.5,6 As Asia makes preparation for an influenza pandemic, it is useful 
to review those lessons learnt from SARS. 
Table 1. SARS in Singapore. Profile of Probable Cases (n=238)7   
 
 
                   No.      % 
Healthcare workers    97    40.8 
Family / household members   55   23.1 
Inpatients     31   13.0 
Visitors to hospital    20     8.4 
Social contacts    15     6.3 
Imported        8     3.4 
Co-workers in market                                 3               1.3 
Taxi drivers         2     0.8 
Flight stewardess      1     0.4 
Undefined           6     2.5 
 
OBJECTIVES 
This paper aims to describe the key lessons learnt in the management of SARS 
within the Singapore perspective.  
Lessons Learnt from the SARS “Battles” 
SARS was a wake-up call for many of us. As individuals, it made us realise how 
vulnerable we were even when we lived in an affluent society with advanced healthcare 
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facilities. As a country, it tested virtually all sectors – health, economy, environment 
and our individual socio-cultural well-being.  
Lesson 1: SARS Affected Many Sectors in Singapore 
Working adults, especially healthcare workers, were predominantly affected (Table 
1). 4 Besides direct patient caregivers like doctors or nurses, paramedical staff such as 
scientists, laboratory technicians (handling patient biological samples), radiographers, 
medical students and cleaners, were also at risk.7-10 
Transmission was not confined within the hospital and spread to the community. 
Other workplaces and workers including storekeepers at the Pasir Panjang Wholesale 
Market and taxi-drivers, were affected (Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  SARS in Singapore. Location of Transmission (n=238)7   
 
          
                      No.        % 
Hospital/Nursing Home   178      74.8 
Household         33      15.5 
Overseas             8        3.4 
Community                         7          2.9 
Pasir Panjang Wholesale Market                3        1.3 
Taxi              2        0.8 
Flight             1        0.4 
Undefined             6        2.5 
 
 
Besides causing clinical respiratory infections, there were a number of SARS 
associated medical conditions that arose in caregivers. Anecdotal incidents included 
work-related stress, hand dermatitis due to repeated alcohol hand washes and pressure 
facial dermatitis due to prolonged use of respirators.11  
 There were social implications that could not be ignored and had to be managed 
with sensitivity. This included: 
 Irrational fear and paranoia. Healthcare workers from the designated SARS 
hospital (Tan Tock Seng Hospital) were reported to be discriminated against; 
patients themselves did not want to be treated at Tan Tock Seng Hospital. 
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Singapore schools were also pressured by the public to close for a period of 
time following reported cases of SARS. Selfish behaviour such as those who 
flaunted their home quarantine orders (openly or otherwise) demonstrated the 
other extremes of human behaviour.  
Social and cultural mindset changes. These had to be modified to promote personal 
and environmental health. Examples were the enforcement of no-spitting or disposal of 
contaminated objects (like tissues with sputum) in public areas.  
Any suspected case could transmit SARS at the workplace; thus any organisation 
was a potential source for community spread. The organisations had to introduce 
measures to prevent SARS including temperature checks, use of personal protective 
equipment and have alternate shifts for critical operations.  
The fallout was the higher operating costs, and resulted in lower profits or losses 
during this period for commercial companies. For example, 6 local restructured 
hospitals were reported claiming $126 million to cover the loss of business due to 
SARS under their ‘business interruption’ insurance coverage.12  
Singapore’s economy appeared to be heading for a recovery at the beginning of 
2003, until it was hit hard, firstly, by US-Iraq War and then by the SARS outbreak. 
Almost all the industries were affected, but this was especially so for tourism, 
hospitality and retail. All sustained increased operational and administrative overheads 
with the implementation of workplace SARS control measures. It was reported that the 
Singapore Government had incurred $192 million in direct operating expenditure 
related to SARS as of 31 May 2003, and committed an additional $105 million 
development expenditure of hospitals for adequate isolation rooms and medical 
facilities to treat SARS and other infectious diseases.13 In addition, an economic relief 
package worth $230 million was also created to aid businesses hit by SARS.  
Lesson 2: First Principles Work in Managing an Emerging Infectious Disease 
Uncertainty prevailed in the initial phase of the SARS outbreak. There was little 
known about the SARS pathogen, clinical characteristics and absence of a diagnostic 
test.14-18 What made it more worrying was the probability of mortality which was 
assessed to be at 14% locally.14  
Returning to basic principles proved to be an effective strategy in controlling the 
SARS outbreak. These are briefly summarised as follows (can be applied within the 
organizational context):15-19 
1. For those who were or suspected to be infected –  
 Detection 
 Isolation 
 Containment 
2. For those who were not infected – 
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 Protect 
 Monitor 
3. For those who may import SARS – 
 Safeguard physical entry 
 Restrict access using designated pathways or zones 
These first principles provide the cornerstone for managing any infectious disease 
outbreak, and must be reviewed during any outbreak response management.  
Lesson 3: SARS is a Nosocomial Infection 
SARS appeared to be primarily nosocomial; and hospitals seemed to amplify the 
disease.15,20-22 Cases not contained within the hospital resulted in spread within the 
community. There were no clusters that originated from the community directly.  
Medical facilities thus play a vital role in the control of the outbreak, and strategies 
targeted here probably reap the greatest yield. Now that the current SARS situation is 
under control, healthcare workers must continue medical surveillance and infection 
control measures despite the absence of SARS affected countries globally.23,24  
Such measures would be effective in the control of emerging infections. However, 
the pattern of transmission will change drastically if air-borne transmission occurs. 
Community clusters would become more prevalent in this instance.  
Lesson 4: Conventional Infection Control Measures May Be Inadequate 
The infection control programmes were the primary means of protecting the 
healthcare workers. Conventional infection control measures comprise of procedures 
traditionally referred to as universal precautions; this focused on preventing disease 
spread from healthcare workers to immunocompromised patients and thus was a form of 
‘reverse’ barrier nursing. Infection control programmes comprised mainly of needle 
stick injury programmes and barriers limited largely to face shields, gowns, gloves and 
goggles during high risk procedures.  
Health authorities quickly realised that conventional means were inadequate, and 
employed ‘enhanced’ infection control measures. These measures built upon existing 
isolation and personal protection practices and a list can be found in Table 3.25-30 
It is thus worth considering the use of enhanced infection control measures during 
the initial phase of uncertainty for any major infectious disease outbreak. Measures can 
be progressively stepped down as the disease becomes controlled.  
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Table 3 Enhanced Infection Control Measures in Hospitals 
 
1. Isolation and prevention of disease transmission within and out of medical 
facility 
 Centralised management of all suspected and probable SARS cases in TTSH  
 Strict enforcement of isolation procedures 
 Forward triage for patients and visitors entering hospitals and polyclinics 
 Designated ambulance service  
 Restrict visitation privileges in hospitals 
 Restrict inter-hospital patient movements  
 Restrict practice of doctors and nurses to selected hospital 
 Responsive contact tracing within hospitals 
2. Protection  
 Strict use of personal protective equipment by healthcare workers and 
visitors  
 Positive air-purifying respirator (N99 grade) for high risk procedures  
3. Monitoring/Surveillance 
 Temperature taking for staff 
 Temperature screening for visitors 
 Monitoring of discharged patients 
 Surveillance of healthcare and patients for febrile clusters  
 
 
 
Lesson 5: SARS (and Respiratory Infections) Make High Demands on the 
Healthcare System 
SARS stretched the various strata of healthcare delivery systems severely. Not only 
were the healthcare workers at highest risk, the disease outcomes also culminated in 
about 20% of cases requiring critical care, requirement for isolation facilities (the 
private wards comprising of single rooms had to be converted to isolation rooms), 
wards which had suspected SARS cases had to be closed (‘no in-no out policy until last 
patient was discharged) and the nationwide (and global) competing demands for 
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personal protective equipment.14,31-37 This was further complicated by the lack of a 
diagnostic test kit which could positively confirm a case of SARS with relative 
certainty. Suspected cases could not be differentiated from non-SARS infections 
(especially influenza that matches the same SARS case definition), and hence contacts 
of suspected cases had to be quarantined 
Aside from respiratory infectious diseases, there are other clinical communicable 
presentations such as diarrhoeal (e.g. salmonella, rotavirus), haemorrhagic (e.g. 
dengue), conjunctivitis (e.g. viral conjunctivitis) and neurological (meningoccocus). In 
general, they may be self-limiting, have lower transmissibility (direct contact or require 
a vector), and there is usually availability of diagnostics, treatment, chemoprophylaxis 
or vaccines.  
Outbreaks of respiratory tract infections thus have the greatest potential to stress the 
healthcare system. Medical preparedness and contingency planning should place 
priority on respiratory outbreaks. More research is required to understand local 
respiratory disease profiles and review clinical policies for respiratory infections. 
Influenza vaccination has been recommended for healthcare workers and nursing 
homes, to reduce the “false positives” by the influenza virus thereby cutting down the 
burden of responding to these triggers and heightened organisational management.38 
Similarly organizations may also want to vaccinate their critical staff or those who 
travel.  
Lesson 6: Implementation of SARS Management Policies at Work Should Be 
Consistent and Transparent 
In such a national crisis, it was inevitable that there would be national policies 
which impacted upon each and every Singaporean resident. Indeed such policies 
impinged into the workplace operations, and they had to be executed in such a manner 
to ensure compliance while at the same time limiting disruption to the work processes 
and costs. Examples of such national policies include: 
Issue of Home Quarantine Orders (HQO): contacts of both probable and suspected 
SARS cases were issued with HQOs and were not to leave their home. Organisations 
had to source for replacements where possible, or the affected employee’s 
responsibilities may have to be undertaken by his colleague. Some companies have 
gone further to remove contacts of these persons with HQOs outside of certain critical 
operations as an added precaution.  
Closure of schools: all schools up to polytechnics and the universities were closed 
during one period when there were a few SARS cases among the students in response to 
public pressure. Parents with children in childcare were probably the most affected, and 
working parents had to take leave to take care of their children thus impacting upon 
workplace operations.  
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Travel advisories and restrictions: travel to other SARS affected countries was 
strongly discouraged; travel to Singapore was also advised against in a number of 
countries during the SARS period. This resulted in some countries relocating their 
operational headquarters during the interim and also discouraged new investors.  
Quarantine of foreign workers: All foreign workers especially those arriving from 
SARS affected countries were required to be quarantined for a period of 10 days before 
being declared “free from SARS” and allowed to work.  
Workplace policies had to be implemented to ensure alignment with national 
policies as well as to prevent the transmission of SARS. They can be broadly classified 
into the following categories:  
 Minimise SARS exposure and risk to workers 
- Health declaration and temperature monitoring for all employees. 
- Health declaration and temperature screening for visitors. 
- Restricting travel to other SARS affected countries (and the company 
may require the individual who has returned from a SARS affected country 
to stay away from the workplace for 10 days before returning to work if 
symptom free). 
 Protecting the individual 
- Health education to increase awareness and limiting any irrational fear. 
- Use of personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves for 
personnel conducting temperature screening. 
 Responding to a case of SARS in the workplace 
- Contact tracing important to identify close contacts. Inability to conduct 
contact tracing effectively may risk closure of the whole unit as in the case 
of Pasir Panjang Wholesale Market where the whole market had to be 
quarantined 
- While it is the role of Medical Officer of Health (MOH) to complete the 
contact tracing, the assistance by the affected company is crucial to identify 
and quarantine the contacts early by providing the schedule of work, 
meetings, etc to the contact tracing team. Some companies have also gone 
ahead to register their employees as they go to different departments or 
offices either manually or sometimes electronically 
 Having additional administrative / precautionary measures to minimise the 
impact of a SARS case in the workplace including 
- Backup teams or the use of functional units in critical areas of the 
company (“Team A and Team B” concept; “1 in 3 or more shift” concept 
i.e. having additional shifts such that there will always be a shift available 
not in contact with the affected shift) 
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- Alternate workplaces such as working from home 
- Anecdotally, it was this group of measures that proved most costly and 
caused the most stress to the affected employees. For instance, while 
having more shifts reduced the duration of work, it usually meant fewer 
persons per shift and higher work demands during the shift 
 Welfare issues including the decision to offer repatriation of foreign staff in 
Singapore. 
Lesson 7: Rapid Evolution of Organisational Policies Was Needed 
As more was known about SARS, new policies were rapidly included and existing 
ones revised. Organisations and their staff need to be flexible and readily adapt. It is 
also important for the policy makers to consider ground implementation issues which 
can be easily overlooked in the fluidity of the situation.39,40 Feedback and ground audits 
are thus essential.  
Lesson 8: Management Emphasis, Multi-disciplinary Involvement and 
Accauntability is Important 
There must be management emphasis from the highest level within the company to 
ensure that the difficult measures are complied with. As with any other crisis 
management, command emphasis is essential and there needs to be the involvement of 
all departments within the company. The responsibility cannot be merely left to the 
medical departments within the organization.41 
A SARS taskforce could be set up to ensure all bases were covered. This is akin to 
the pivotal role played by the Prime Minister (as shown in his open letter to all 
Singaporeans) and the creation of the Inter-Ministerial SARS Executive Group which 
addressed the SARS policies in Singapore.42 
Lesson 9. Information Management and Communications Are Crucial 
National policies were being created, promulgated and subsequently revised at a 
rapid rate in response to the outbreak. An organisation must ensure that all its personnel 
are kept updated and understand the rationale behind both the national as well as the 
organisation’s SARS policies.43-46 
Where national policies require a change in socio-cultural mindsets (such as 
personal hygiene, staying away from home if unwell; sharing of food at meals), the 
organisation has a significant role in workplace education and promotion. It also 
requires a sensitive and responsive management to prevent social discrimination (such 
as alienation of those on HQO, or contacts and SARS cases who have returned to work). 
Lesson 10: Business Continuity Plans Should Be Prepared   
When the global SARS outbreak was being contained as evidenced by the absence 
of SARS affected countries, Singapore phased down measures. At the same time, 
organizations prepared increasing levels of precautionary measures in response to 
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various SARS risk levels as a form of business continuity in the event of reemergence 
of disease.47-49  
Firstly, stratifying the risk based upon transmission both externally and locally. For 
example, it could be based upon the classification used by the World Health 
Organisation. Subsequently, the level and type of control measures could then be 
matched with the risk level thereby forming the basic Business Continuity Plan (see 
Table 4 for example).  
A plan to exercise organisation readiness to SARS recurrence should be done to 
keep the system “warm”. For instance, the Ministry of Health conducted regular audits 
and contact tracing exercises in all healthcare institutions. 
Table 4. SARS Business Continuity Plan (example) 
 
 
Risk Level  
 
 
Routine Areas 
 
 
Critical Areas 
 
 
Negligible risk. 
 
No other SARS 
affected countries 
globally. 
 
• No additional precautions required. 
• Reinforcement of Good Hygiene Practices – personal and 
collective during training 
• Reinforcement of cleanliness within premises 
• Reinforcement of hygiene practices canteen operators 
 
Low risk 
 
SARS affected 
country outside 
Singapore 
 
Local imported 
case contained 
without 
transmission. 
 
 Travel restriction for all 
 Monitor and Declaration of area/country 
 Consider home leave if return from affected 
area/country within incubation period 
 Temperature regime 
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Moderate risk. 
 
Imported with 
limited 
transmission. 
 
• As above. 
• Screening for civilians entering 
premises  
• May need to consider pre-departure 
quarantine 
 
• As above 
• Shifts 
 
High risk. 
 
Community 
outbreak. 
 
• As above 
 
 
• As above 
• Alternate 
workplace 
CONCLUSION 
 
The SARS outbreak has demonstrated emphatically both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Singapore response. The lessons learnt have proven to be crucial in 
the changes of the healthcare infrastructure framework within Singapore and assisted in 
planning for an influenza pandemic.  
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